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The research assessment framework is an unstable reality in many countries. While 
few would disagree that there is a need to measure and reward research excellence, 
there has been little investigation of how assessment mechanisms relate to knowledge 
itself. With a focus on the arts and humanities and writing from an Australian 
perspective, this paper draws together discussions of research assessment frameworks 
and forms of knowledge to consider what can and cannot be measured, and what we 
might gain from (or lose from not) measuring these things. We argue that the focus on 
measurable outputs risks a culture that favours effective packages of knowledge at the 
same time as ignoring the immeasurable, or hidden elements of research and 









The national Excellence for Research in Australia (ERA) initiative was announced in 
2008 and is one of a growing number of national research assessment frameworks 
including those implemented in the UK (1986), Hong Kong (1993), Germany (1997), 
the Netherlands (2002), New Zealand (2003) and France (2005). The new Research 
Excellence Framework (REF) in the UK will be implemented in 2014 and retains the 
assessment foci of research output, impact and significance, and research environment 
(Higher Education Funding Council for England 2009). 
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The ERA was flagged as a comprehensive research quality and evaluation 
system on the basis of evidence from other frameworks, which were heralded as 
having demonstrated that “research assessment improves research quality” (Sheil 2010, 
n. p). The Australian Research Council (ARC) viewed the UK Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE), for example, as having increased international recognition of UK 
research, research funding and government funding, and both research quality and 
quantity. Conversely, academic research on the RAE has reported its less positive 
impact on academic work and identity (Harley 2002); motivation (Sikes 2006); 
publishing behaviour (Trevorrow & Volmer 2012); scholarly autonomy (Weyer 2012); 
and interdisciplinary research (Rafols et al., 2012).  
The ERA framework, which was implemented in 2010, classifies knowledge 
into three hierarchical levels comprising 22 divisions, 157 groups and 1,238 fields of 
research. Each of these classifications belongs to one of eight clusters. The arts and the 
humanities belong to a cluster called Humanities and Creative Arts (HCA). For each 
assessment, Australian universities submit information about their research activities to 
the ARC. This information includes staffing profile, publications and other research 
outputs (including creative research), awards, grants, income, and applied measures 
such as patents. 
A Research Evaluation Committee (REC) for each discipline cluster comprises 
researchers with both discipline expertise and expertise in research evaluation. For 
each institution that has reached the necessary research volume threshold, the relevant 
REC rates the research excellence for each field of research (FoR) code within their 
discipline cluster. The thresholds for ERA 2012 were 50 indexed journal articles for 
disciplines where citation analysis is used, and 50 weighted research outputs for 
disciplines where peer review is used. A range of summary indicators and quality 
assessments provided by the ARC includes measures of research application and 
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recognition, as well as more traditional measures of quality such as citation analysis or 
peer review. There are also discipline-specific national and international benchmarks, 
again provided by the ARC. In cases where the REC does not have the relevant 
expertise to assess a specific body of work, additional peer reviewers assess the 
research outputs. In 2012, over 1,000 researchers were involved as members of a REC 
or as peer reviewers. 
The REC assigns a rating at the four-digit FoR code level unless the volume 
threshold is not reached, in which case the two-digit FoR code is assessed. ERA 
utilises a five-point rating scale in which the Unit of Evaluation profile is characterised 
by evidence of performance as described in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Rating of performance applied to each Unit of Evaluation 
 
Rating Description of performance for each rating 
5 Evidence of outstanding performance well above world standard  
4 Evidence of performance above world standard  
3 Evidence of average performance at world standard  
2 Evidence of performance below world standard  
1 Evidence of performance well below world standard  
 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2012) 
 
The stated objectives of the ERA are to establish an evaluation framework; to 
provide a national stocktake of research to identify research strengths and 
opportunities; to identify excellence in research; to identify emerging areas; and to 
benchmark research nationally and internationally. Writing from the perspective of the 
arts and humanities, this paper focuses on the third of these points: identifying 
excellence in research. 
While few would disagree with the need to recognise and reward research 
excellence, there has been little investigation of how assessment mechanisms relate to 
knowledge itself. In this paper we explore what can and cannot be measured, and what 
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we might gain from (or lose from not) measuring these things. We establish the context 
with a brief description of recent change experienced within Australian higher 
education, and some of the ways in which knowledge has been categorised. We then 
step back in time to the emergence of the humanities, considering the treatment of 
knowledge long before the era of the corporatised university. We conclude by 
highlighting a number of challenges, benefits and implications presented by the 
implementation of research assessment frameworks, not least of which is the extent to 
which they can assess research.  
 
The Australian context of assessment 
The ERA framework is an inevitable result of rapid change within Australia’s higher 
education sector over the past forty years, with major shifts largely aimed at increasing 
productivity to meet national goals for higher education learning and research. Over 
the same period, reduced government funding forced higher education institutions to 
earn income elsewhere. In 1996, for example, Australian state and federal governments 
provided approximately 58% of all funds to universities. By 2005 government funding 
was reduced to 40% (Universities Australia 2009) and it is likely that this trend will 
continue. 
The growing need for sourcing non-government income explains in part the 
institutional focus on income generated through research and high income-producing 
courses; however, the focus is also indicative of a cultural shift. Recent history reveals 
a culture of corporatisation, amalgamation and increasing accountability within a 
climate of diminishing funding and the corresponding need to demonstrate that existing 
monies are spent productively and efficiently (Meyers 2012; Parker, 2005). This is 
unsurprising given the size of the sector: Australia's 39 universities alone enrol more 
than one million students and employ more than 100,000 staff (Universities Australia 
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2012). The measurement of excellence is central to the future of Australian higher 
education, since excellence—however it is defined and measured—equals funding. 
 
Assessing knowledge through assessment frameworks 
Within this setting the treatment of knowledge is crucial, because divisions of 
knowledge and the reporting of achievement against them have considerable 
implications for academics and managers within an environment characterised by 
increased accountability and decreased employment stability, fierce competition for 
competitive funding, and concern about both individual research track record and 
publicly-displayed institutional achievement. 
We draw here a distinction between a number of words in English that relate 
to knowledge or its use: for example, information, insight, wisdom, intelligence, and 
critical thinking. Within the higher education sector, knowledge is (perhaps implicitly) 
understood in all these nuances. Whilst knowledge presented in the form of a 
scientific treatise or creative production probably includes aspects of information, 
wisdom and intelligence, most importantly it demonstrates insight and critical 
thinking, a point with which no doubt Aristotle would agree. In Nicomachean Ethics 
(Nic. Eth.), Aristotle deals with actions done and the rational quality inherent in them, 
listing five qualities through which the mind can find the truth either by affirming or 
denying: art or technical skill, scientific knowledge, prudence, wisdom, and 
intelligence (Bekker, 1934, 1139b). Aristotle adopted four Questions of Cause, with 
‘cause’ referring to an explanatory factor or aition (αἴτιον) that assists in the 
generation of knowledge. In simple terms the formal cause asks what sort of thing it 
is; the material cause asks about a thing’s substance; the efficient cause asks how it 
came into being; and the final cause asks about its role. 
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Frederick (1998, p. 1) explains that Aristotle “formalized the relation between 
the evidence gathered by studying things in the world and coming to true conclusions 
about those things”, emphasising method and logic in the process of research through 
which knowledge is generated. As Mulcahy (2010, p. 307) explains, 
Aristotle used the term ‘liberal’ to refer to the knowledge one seeks out of mere curiosity or 
for enjoyment, and he characterized knowledge that was sought for some purpose beyond 
itself as mechanical or useful (1903, p. 108). This laid the groundwork for a distinction 
between liberal knowledge or liberal education intended to promote one’s potential to learn 
and to enjoy knowledge, and professional or practical education intended to offer knowledge 
and skills needed in professional areas such as the practice of law, in a range of vocational and 
technical occupations, and in service to others. 
 
The simplistic treatment of knowledge within assessment frameworks such as 
the ERA does not consider the method and logic in the process of research; nor does it 
value insight and critical thinking. However, the categorisation of fields of study is far 
from new.  
 
The (new) humanities.  
Taking our starting point from Aristotle, we step back in time to consider the 
emergence of what we know as the humanities. We then explore how knowledge has 
been understood in this multidisciplinary field. 
The ability to know has been of interest since ancient times, and formal 
divisions of knowledge can be traced back to the ancient world. Aristotle, who wrote 
on an array of subjects ranging from physics to poetry, is remembered not as a 
specialist but as a philosopher. This is because philosophy, in Aristotle’s time, was 
taken to mean the broad pursuit of wisdom or knowledge by intellectual means. 
However, for Aristotle and his contemporaries, scholarly disciplines were determined 
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in response to the research question being asked and the method employed to ask the 
question. There is a long tradition of categorising what we might call ‘the liberal arts’, 
from the Stoics’ grouping together of grammar, rhetoric and dialectics, through the 
acknowledgment of this trivium in the European Middle Ages over and against the 
remaining four liberal arts—arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music—as a 
quadrivium of mathematical subjects. These divisions were made on the basis that “the 
trivium includes those aspects of the liberal arts that pertain to mind, and the 
quadrivium, those aspects of the liberal arts that pertain to matter” (Joseph 2002, p. 3). 
Thus as the humanities disciplines emerged in the Renaissance period as educational 
programs in response to humanism and the revival of Graeco-Roman culture, their 
focus was the mind, with subjects studied and analysed rather than acted out or 
experienced (Levi 1970). 
Despite the widespread impetus of the humanist movement, the humanities did 
not emerge as distinct fields of study until the nineteenth century, and it was only then 
that the term ‘humanities’ came into common use. Shumway (2007, p. 1) suggests that 
the modern humanities disciplines are the result of three conditions: “a shift in the 
conception of knowledge that demoted texts to objects of study; the break up of 
philosophy into the sciences; and the invention of the disciplinary form itself [entailing 
among other things] new pedagogical spaces of the classroom and the laboratory, and 
new practices, such as the seminar”.  
The cluster of subjects we now recognise as ‘traditional’ humanities were thus 
largely defined in the 19th century. Aligned with humanist fascination with the ancient 
world, many of the humanities centred on studies of antiquity: classical history, 
language, arts, culture, philosophy and so on. Modern languages and literature came 
later, and in many countries the creative arts moved to specialist institutions only to be 
brought back into the university system over the past 50 years or so. Contemporary and 
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popular culture count among the subjects to have been added over that period. As 
Tymoczko (2001, p. 287) explains,  
[C]hanging views of knowledge during the 20th century undermined the 19th-century 
epistemological and ideological premises of the traditional humanities and, indeed, of academe 
as a whole. The humanities were by and large transformed, particularly in the second half of the 
20th century, as post-positivist views of knowledge shifted inquiry away from primary research 
oriented toward digging out and amassing observable ‘facts’, to self-reflexive methods 
involving interrogations of perspective, premises, and the framework of inquiry itself. 
 
For the vast majority of academics, knowledge and its application is a matter 
for the mind. The advent of creative production into the mainstream of acceptable 
academic outputs brings a further possibility that perhaps knowledge may be linked 
with the physical knowing within the body or even to some idea of spirit, whether this 
is related to a reality beyond the human or regarded as an aspect of the human.  
Neither of these ideas would be strange to pre-enlightenment societies. The 
first of Aristotle’s qualities through which the mind can find the truth is art or 
technical skill. In Aristotle’s time, art was not defined in terms of the creative arts. 
Architectural skill, for example, was defined as an art:  
Now architectural skill, for instance, is an art, and it is also a rational quality concerned with 
making; nor is there any art which is not a rational quality concerned with making, nor any 
such quality which is not an art. It follows that an art is the same thing as a rational quality, 
concerned with making, that reasons truly… (Bekker, 1934, 1140a)  
 
On this basis it may have been easier to accommodate the arts within a 300BCE 
research framework than in a contemporary one. 
Humanities is and has always been interested in what and how humans know 
and create and have insight in relation to themselves and other realities, imagined 
entities or living beings. Perhaps what is ‘new’ in the new humanities is greater 
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acknowledgement of the entire action of knowledge production and application to 
include creative activity or professional application. 
Wierzbicka (2011) writes that the word ‘humanities’ is misunderstood because 
it is not commonly used. Her concerns are borne out in the different definitions 
adopted by each of the 56 State Humanities Councils in the United States, which define 
the Humanities in terms of activities within their region. Likewise there is little 
consistency between universities, which define humanities according to the courses 
they offer. Bennett (2011) notes that Stanford University, which has fifteen humanities 
departments, describes the humanities as “the study of the myriad ways in which 
people, from every period of history and from every corner of the globe, process and 
document the human experience” (Stanford 2010, n. p). In contrast, Princeton (2011, n. 
p) adopts a common, non-vocational definition of the humanities: namely “studies 
intended to provide general knowledge and intellectual skills (rather than occupational 
or professional skills).”  
Non-vocational definitions such as the one Princeton uses have formed the 
basis of many statements in defence of the humanities, which some believe “can 
defend themselves best by refusing to make any claims of utility” (Fish, 2008, n. p). 
However, this is a perilous stance that has failed to stem criticism that traditional 
humanities programs are “both expensive and relatively useless” (Humanities in the 
United States 2010) in the job market. Such claims have contributed to the demise of 
many traditional humanities courses. In Australia, for example, Queensland University 
of Technology closed its School of Humanities and Human Services in favour of a 
focus on the more popular (and vocationally oriented) creative industries (Ianziti May 
2007, n. p). The need for clarification and rigorous debate is further illustrated with the 
example of the Australian Academy of the Humanities (AAH), which received 
research funding “to chart the disposition and trends of the humanities sector in 
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Australia … to arrive at a nuanced understanding of the key issues facing the sector 
today” (AAH 2009, n. p). 
Whilst not the primary focus of this paper, the treatment of non-traditional 
forms of research output such as artistic or creative research needs special mention. 
Following a decade during which artistic research was not formally recognised within 
Australian higher education, the ERA brought recognition for artistic research in four 
categories: Original (creative) works in the public domain; Live performance works in 
the public domain; Recorded (performance) public works; and Curated or produced 
substantial public exhibitions, events or renderings (Australian Research Council 
2008). 
These ‘non-traditional’ research outputs are subject to peer review, and each 
output nominated for peer review must be accompanied by a 250-word statement that 
identifies the research background (field, context and research question), the research 
contribution (innovation and contribution to new knowledge), and the research 
significance (evidence of excellence). The requirement for a research statement is at 
odds with the peer recognition that legitimises research in most other areas, and the 
peer assessment process raises questions about public recognition and quality, and 
about transparency and consistency. As Blom, Bennett and Wright (2011, p. 364) 
argue, 
An original contribution to knowledge can be judged by those with experience in the 
discipline – one’s peers. However, artistic research is more than that and there is a compelling 
argument that, rather than being merely an equivalent, it should be recognized as research in 
its own right. 
 
Aside from the necessity to demonstrate ‘equivalence’ with traditional outputs, 
accumulating the evidence required for the assessment of artistic research can be 
complex and demanding, both of individuals and institutions (Schilo 2012). Writing 
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from the UK, Niedderer and Roworth-Stokes (2007, p. 5) have identified another 
potentially negative impact of recognising a previously unrewarded activity: namely 
that “by opening research to the inclusion of [artistic] practice, the need arose to 
legitimise the use of practice within research and with regard to its contribution to 
knowledge.” Contrary to Aristotle’s notion of art dealing with the same objects as 
chance, research assessment requires academics to unravel hidden, at times 
spontaneous components of their work that can be considered to be at risk if subjected 
to over-analysis. 
 
Are we attempting to measure the immeasurable? 
Universities are supported by public money and have a duty to demonstrate the 
efficient and effective use of those monies. Whilst TEQSA is evaluating higher 
education institutions against standards, ERA is seeking to differentiate between them 
in terms of quality and excellence. That said, could any framework accurately reflect 
excellence in research? Should we accept the need to measure research? Given the cost 
of such an assessment exercise, would the funding be better spent on research itself? 
What influence is ERA having on the academics whose work is assessed? To begin to 
answer these questions we highlight below a number of challenges, benefits and 
implications presented by the adoption of research frameworks. In so doing we hope to 
stimulate further debate about the merits and disadvantages of research measurement, 
and perhaps prompt further discussion about how this process can be managed within 
an institution. 
  
Traditional scientific research remains the norm, but can one size fit all? 
The first issue we address is that traditionally notated ‘scientific’ research remains the 
accepted norm. This has particular implications for the arts and humanities, where 
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innovative and non-traditional modes of research need to be accommodated within 
much less flexible research frameworks. However, the sciences are similarly concerned 
about the integrity and efficacy of research frameworks.  
Speaking at a 2004 Australian national conference on measuring research 
excellence, Jim Peacock, then President of the Australian Academy of Science, 
described the changing nature of science research and research training, which features 
increasing intersections across disciplines. Describing the changing definition of 
science in the UK, Peacock (2004, p. 6) explained the confusion that arose when policy 
makers “quite explicitly, up front, talk about science, engineering, social science and 
the humanities … [W]hen they talk about science skills and innovation they are talking 
about the whole spectrum”. The emergence of broad research areas such as 
sustainability lends support to the notion that the traditional ‘silos’ of activity are less 
and less relevant to contemporary research. Moreover, as Marginson (2010, p. 4) has 
argued, performance assessment and output modelling have meant that: “Larger 
aggregated outcomes, such as the contribution of liberal education to citizen formation, 
or the long term effects of basic research, fall out of the picture”. Short reporting cycles 
also lead to the question of how a retrospective measure can accommodate the new as 
well as the extant. This includes new fields of study, new knowledge on the edge of a 
subject area, and new researchers.  
The relative inability of research frameworks to accommodate multi-
disciplinary and inter-disciplinary research is troublesome, since in reality many more 
academics are working across traditional boundaries and it is this intersection that 
offers some of the most exciting opportunities in contemporary research. However, in 
several studies the problem of accommodating interdisciplinary work has been traced 
beyond the general framework to those engaged especially in peer review within that 
framework. As Rafols et al (2012, p. 1262) note, the possible bias of peer reviewers 
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against interdisciplinary work was identified as problematical as early as the Boden 
Report, which warned of “systematic bias” (ABRC 1990, p. 4). This must be of 
especial concern then for the humanities, where peer review is the norm for the ERA. 
 
Does ERA measure knowledge? 
Perhaps, if we recognised how knowledge has come about and if the methods of 
measuring were applied in the right way, or in a way that takes account of all the 
aspects that have been required to produce a certain output, we could measure 
knowledge and its application. The very thought of implementing such a complex and 
expensive measure would represent a formidable task for any administrator or 
researcher.  
While some forms of the application of knowledge are clear in learned journal 
articles, the process of generating this knowledge may be unclear. Does this output 
simply comprise the amassing of information? Was critical thinking brought to bear on 
the issue or gathered material? Was there a moment of insight, a sudden clarity, a leap 
from ‘the facts’ to some idea, and no explanation for how the leap occurred? Did 
numerous previous attempts, experiments and perspectives inform this insight? What 
was the state of mind or body of the academic who produced such a work? 
In a sense, where knowledge appears easiest to understand and evaluate it may 
be the least understandable. The evaluation of a creative work, for example, may be 
difficult for many academics to understand. A creative work can at least superficially 
appear more transparent in its various aspects: aspects such as mind, body, critical 
thinking and insight. However, as Elliot (2011, p. 104) asserts: 
We may readily agree that a dance is not a painting, but the varieties of measuring criteria that 
derive from this obvious observation are manifold … the ERA process has focused the notion 
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of measurement on the creative arts and it is up to creative practicing academics to articulate 
the standards and defend the validity of the way ‘creatives’ also create new knowledge. 
 
This articulation could include consideration of the less daunting and perhaps more 
practical question of what we are currently missing: what is there of value that cannot 
or has not been measured? 
 
Does context matter? 
Is research behaviour sensitive to context? How does the measure of research take into 
account the context of the research or researchers or the broader context of the 
institution within which the research takes place, or indeed the context of the national 
and international research beyond any single institution? While the initial contribution 
may be considered academic, a brief consideration of hermeneutics can illustrate that 
there are always social, cultural, and political values inherent in particular ways of 
producing or applying knowledge. 
Ways of knowing and interpreting the world are based in multiple integrated 
beings, objects and methodologies: knowing facts, knowing oneself and knowing 
others in attempting to know facts; acknowledging that where one stands and who one 
is can make a difference to the way one asks a question, or even what questions one 
chooses to ask in order to know something. Questions and standpoints inevitably 
present a particular line of sight, or view, so the contextualisation of the activity in 
which knowledge is produced or applied may be important. Again, the multiplicity of 
contexts may be so great as to make reasonable measurement and comparison of 
activity too difficult, and yet it remains crucial. 
Scientists have long acknowledged that their production or application of 
knowledge is not limited to the activity of the rational, neutral or disinterested mind; 
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and yet what lies beyond the limits of the rational is not acknowledged in the process 
of measuring the knowledge output. Whether in physics or painting, the ERA process 
rewards the ability to package research into a measurable output such as a traditional 
journal article, or to defend it in the form of the research statement accompanying a 
creative work. This has led to a culture of hiring writers – effective communicators of 
knowledge – to finesse both academic papers and grant applications, and of course to 
package and massage institutional ERA submissions. Whilst effective packaging may 
be a legitimate element of communicating knowledge, it is not knowledge. 
ERA, then, does not reward the ‘knowing’ per se. Rather, it rewards the 
expression of knowledge in an acceptable, measureable way. What are the implications 
of this? At first sight, the 1,238 different specialist fields of research within the ERA 
Framework appear far from restrictive, recognising engagement across multiple 
academic fields of research and a breadth of disciplinary knowledge and expertise. 
However, the divisions also present potential silos of activity against which 
achievement is reported by institutions. Within institutions, high-scoring fields of 
research are likely to attract additional strategic funding whilst low-scoring areas are 
likely to receive either remedial attention or the threat of closure: “Given the rumoured 
imperatives in most universities in the country to either ‘bolster or bury’ research 
outputs to ensure a quality submission, the strategic implications for particular 
disciplinary groupings at a four-digit level are of concern (Schilo 2012, p. 222). 
Accordingly, academics feel increasing pressure to publish within their disciplines and 
contribute to their area’s research performance, and they face increasing resistance to 
multidisciplinary research. This is of course common to multiple frameworks: the REF 
in the UK has also been said to “mitigate against most cross-disciplinary and multi-
disciplinary work. For those engaged in the study of subjects that lack a clear 
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disciplinary ‘home’, such as sustainability, this retreat is particularly frustrating” 
(Wells 2011, p. 4).  
In sum, the commodification of knowledge is problematic for governments 
because knowledge per se has no common currency, can be tacit or hidden, and can be 
presented in multiple ways. In simple terms, a published research output will often 
report the results or outcomes of knowledge, rather than knowledge itself. Knowledge 
is not something research assessment frameworks can measure.  
 
Does ERA measure excellence? 
The ERA seeks to “identify excellence across the full spectrum of research 
performance” (ARC 2011a, n. p). Units of Evaluation are assessed and rated by 
Research Evaluation Committees comprised of experienced, internationally recognised 
experts. Research quality, or excellence, is assessed “on the basis of publishing 
behaviour, citation analysis, ERA peer review, and peer reviewed Australian and 
international research income” (ARC, 2011b, p. 9). The ERA initially ranked research 
journals, implying that articles published in highly ranked journals are better than those 
published elsewhere (Vanclay 2010). The journal rankings were officially abandoned 
in 2011, but they continue to impact scholarly publishing activity.   
Returning once more to context and value, a further consideration is the 
potential loss of the independent scholarly voice (Parker 2005) as academics become 
more risk-adverse in their research and publishing decisions. Whilst ERA is almost 
unique in that it does not report individual performance, institutions are closely 
monitoring individual performance and are drawing on the ERA data to do so. This 
adds to the pressure to align valuable research time with activity that is immediately 
publishable, and the dilemma was not unforeseen. Writing a decade ago, Brew (2001, 
p. 86) was one of several commentators to warn that “the application of a rational 
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framework to research activity does away only with those social values which differ 
from the dominant values in the academic community”; and in the UK the particular 
threat to research in the arts and humanities was met with the comment that the REF 
“may have the effect of disincentivising research that does not translate into immediate 
measurable impact for public policy or industry in the UK” (Shepherd 2009, n. p). 
There exist numerous examples of research projects being refined to align with the 
scope of a targeted journal or funding scheme; in general “most faculty have engaged 
in, if not exactly bought into, the models of assessment and evaluation that often link 
academic performance and centrality to financial salience, all in the name of value” 
(Delgado 2011, p. 1809).  
Graham (2004) raised concerns about a reliance on the imperfect measures of 
grant success and citations, explaining that large grants with large teams and expensive 
equipment are historically less successful than individuals or small teams; and that 
citations do not work as a measure, neither in the short term nor the longer term. 
Indeed, citations within a research framework reporting cycle are unable to give, even 
in the sciences, an accurate view of research excellence. Citing the example of a 
seminal paper, the findings of which influence clinicians’ daily practice, Graham 
(2004, p. 13) remarked that the paper itself would be rarely cited today. The research 
“is something that we use all the time and is of enormous, immense importance to us in 
treating patients, but its discovery is now something that has been forgotten.”  
We seem to have come full circle, back to the context of research. The 
simplistic, purely quantitative approach to research assessment has long been accused 
of “rewarding mediocrity rather than quality” (McCalman 2004, p. 22), and there are 
ample examples of why this is so. Wells (2011, p. 2) agrees that “it is perfectly 
possible for a research project to be a complete disaster for the funding body, it could 
fail to deliver what was required, it could be terribly managed, and yet it could be 
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regarded as excellent if journal publications of a sufficient quality result”. Similarly, it 
is quite feasible in the current system to ignore the larger context of academic work in 
order to enhance one’s chances of success (Marginson 2011).  
As institutions strive to achieve in the league tables and research assessment 
“becomes the driver of teaching policies, including course offerings and class sizes, as 
well as institutional and individual choices regarding topic, type of research and 
publication destination” (Thornton 2008, p. 7), it threatens to essentially relegate 
scholarship, teaching and public activity to the backbench. 
 
Closing comments 
Scholars in the arts and humanities analyse both the subject of their research and the 
relationships of that subject with the external environment, considering aspects such as 
purpose, reception, use and impact. In essence, these researchers rarely analyse 
something without looking beyond it; yet looking beyond it invariably entails working 
across disciplinary boundaries. For Australian researchers this might seem the 
antithesis of the ERA with its 1,238 fields of research.  
Aristotle asserted that we do not understand something until we know what it is 
for, what it is made from, what it does, how it interacts, and who needs it. Frederick 
(1998, p. 2) describes this assertion as problematic “in the sense that sometimes, 
innovations happen by accident thus not allowing us to fully know what it is for, what 
it aims at or what is does.” However, Aristotle could appreciate the failures and 
accidental discoveries, and truly embodied research journeys as underpinning future 
thinking, future Forms or universals. The issue here is how much of Aristotle’s 
thinking would have been measurable within a research framework such as the ERA. 
His broad subject base would certainly not be well received, and yet the ability to 
transcend boundaries is perhaps what most defines making and managing knowledge 
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in the arts and humanities. Having selected his field of research codes and considered 
what his school, faculty and institutional priorities were, it is entirely possible that 
Aristotle would have needed to reconsider his research activities in order to be deemed 
research active.  
Broadly speaking, research assessment has so far fallen into four categories: 
peer review, self-assessment, historical rankings, and quantitative measures. The latter 
is increasingly common as the complexities of other approaches come to the fore. 
Thus the peer review process for many areas of the arts and humanities is more likely 
to be both presented and treated by research administrators/managers as problematical 
rather than as an equal partner with the quantitative measure so easily applied to the 
sciences.  
Whilst it is natural to categorise and order things to understand them better, the 
divisions or categories imposed by research assessment frameworks serve the very 
different purpose of responding to a broad policy agenda. Current measures do not 
measure research or excellence; rather, they reward outputs of research that have been 
packaged in a measurable way. An unintended but inevitable result is that academic 
behaviour is skewed. 
We began by suggesting that few would disagree that there is a need to 
recognise and reward research excellence. We hold to this view, but question whether 
anyone has yet in fact found a way to do this. Hunt observed in 1959 that research is 
“not an end in itself, but a means to the primary ends of scholarship: teaching and 
public activity” (in McManners & Crawford 1965). Aristotle would have agreed to 
some extent: 
It is true that a certain variety is to be observed among the ends at which the arts and 
sciences aim: in some cases the activity of practising the art is itself the end, whereas 
in others the end is some product over and above the mere exercise of the art; and in 
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the arts whose ends are certain things beside the practice of the arts themselves, these 
products are essentially superior in value to the activities. But as there are numerous 
pursuits and arts and sciences, it follows that their ends are correspondingly 
numerous: for instance, the end of the science of medicine is health, that of the art of 
shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of domestic economy wealth 
(Bekker, 1934, 1094a). 
 
Ultimately Aristotle sees two possible outcomes or ends for the arts and 
sciences: first, the knowledge of the truth which comes from the activity of practising 
the art itself; and secondly, the public product that results from the activity and which 
is superior to the activity. The ERA represents an attempt to measure the first, but it 
can be plotted as a kind of mid-point between these two ends; it measures not the 
activity but rather the package that describes or attempts to communicate the activity, 
and nor does it measure the public impact or product. Future research assessment 
exercises need to move back from the mid-point and consider how to assess effectively 
the activity of research, and to consider measuring the superior end that is the public 
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